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The last two decades have witnessed the implementation of liberal economic reforms throughout
the developing world, but particularly in Latin American and the Caribbean. It is now a stylized
fact of reform programs that income distribution worsens in the immediate aftermath of the
implementation of such reforms (Cornia, et. al., 1987; Morley, 1995; Beccaria, 1998). In 11 of
14 Latin American countries included in his survey, Morely (1994) found that inequality had
worsened in all but four of them during the 1980s when reform programs were implemented.
In that regard, Jamaica has been a paradox. Handa and King (1997) date economic reform
as taking place mostly since 1989. Throughout the 1990s, however, the income distribution has
consistently narrowed, despite periods of both rising and falling poverty levels during this time.
The decline in inequality in Jamaica is unusual for another reason as well. While
economic growth may on occasion be accompanied by declining inequality, witness Brazil in the
1980s, the preponderance of evidence from the Latin American/Caribbean region suggests that
inequality is strongly countercyclical (Psacharopolous, et al., 1997; Morley, 1994). During the
1980s, Argentina, Panama, and Venezuela all experienced increases in inequality while their per
capita incomes fell, while Columbia and Costa Rica both had positive growth and declines in
inequality (Psacharopolous, et. al., 1997).1 At the same time, there is no prior measured
experience in the region of declining inequality in the presence of falling per capita income. The
case of Jamaica, with just such an occurance in the period 1992 to 1996, therefore merits close
scrutiny.
The Jamaica experience can potentially reveal much about how the process of adjustment
can affect income distribution. Are the distributional outcomes in Jamaica an accident of the
particular circumstances of the adjustment, or are there lessons in the manner of adjustment that
have implications for other reforming economies?
The earliest published attempt to analyze the degree of income inequality in Jamaica
(Ahiram, 1964), using data for 1958, concludes that Jamaica suffered a higher degree of income
inequality than most developing countries with data available at the time.2 Ahiram reports a Gini
of 53 percent for the distribution of household income and 57 percent for the distribution of
individual income. Londoño and Székely (1997) report that, by 1970, Jamaica was characterized
by one of the most equal distributions in the Latin American and Caribbean region, though the
region tends to be more unequal than the remainder of the developing world. They report a Gini
of 45.6 for 1970, which by 1989 had fallen marginally to 43.3. From the data reported below, in
1996 the Gini was down to 36.9. The purpose of this paper is to examine the distributional
6changes in Jamaica in order to explain the paradox of such a dramatic decline in inequality
during and after a period of economic reform, and, after 1992, in the presence of macroeconomic
stagnation.
While the penchant for liberal economic reforms has shifted the focus away from issues
of distribution, the concern in the literature and in this paper for inequality derives from two
considerations. Ravallian (1997) has demonstrated that the growth elasticity of poverty is
inversely correlated with the degree of inequality. Thus, as inequality increases, growth has a
smaller impact on poverty reduction. A concern for absolute poverty therefore requires an
interest in distribution to the extent that it informs the likelihood of poverty reduction.
Moreover, the link between initial inequality and subsequent economic growth has been
demonstrated (Deininger and Squire, 1998; Birdsall, et al., 1995).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 reviews the data on
changes in the distribution of income that have occurred during the period. Section 2 summarizes
the economic reform program and the macroeconomic context of the period under analysis,
examining the extent to which the manner and pace of reform implementation explains the
distributional outcomes. Section 3 attempts to explain the distributional outcomes in terms of the
broader context of the policy framework and the consequential fluctuations of the
macroeconomy.
7I.  CHANGES IN DISTRIBUTION
Data for the analysis of inequality is taken from the Jamaican Survey of living Conditions, a
nationally representative household survey administered annually since 1989, and based on the
Living Standards Measurement Surveys (LSMS) of the World Bank. As in other LSMS type
surveys, welfare is measured by total household consumption expenditure (deflated by household
size or demographic composition).  The relative merit of using consumption instead of income to
measure living standard is well known (Ravallion, 1994; Quibria, 1991). Consumption more
accurately reflects long run welfare since households attempt to minimize the consumption
effects of transitory income shocks by way of saving/dissaving. Consumption is much easier to
measure than income in developing countries due to seasonality and the existence of multiple
income sources. Finally, income from informal economic activity is difficult to identify much
less measure. Deininger and Squire (1996) indicate that using expenditure instead of income
reduces the measured Gini by about 6.6 percentage points.
Earned income is reported in the labor force household survey, but the data is notoriously
incomplete. In the 1993 survey, for example, nearly 60 percent of the cells for income were
missing data. The JSLC survey reports only on unearned income, and in any case is reported at
the level of the household, and not assigned to individual members. For all of the above reasons,
we use per capita household expenditure to proxy income. The use of per capita household data
ought not to bias the estimates of inequality. Londoño and Székely (1997) find that there is no
significance difference between Ginis computed on the basis of individual data and those done at
the level of the household.
We begin by presenting two popular indices of inequality, the Gini coefficient and the
Theil entropy measure, for three years of survey data: 1989, 1993, and 1996. We follow the
standard procedure of attributing to each individual in a household the household level per capita
expenditure, thus ignoring issues of intra-household resource allocation. We provide estimates of
these two indexes for the entire sample. Table 1 presents these estimates for each of the three
years, as well as the mean per capita expenditure of the sample, while Table 2 presents the




Gini 0.436 0.382 0.369
Theil Entropy 0.341 0.260 0.251
Mean p/c Expenditure (1989J$)2 6407 6019 4961
Source: The Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions.
Note: Calculated by assigning household per capita consumption expenditure to each individual member
1/ Characteristic of household head.  2/ CPI deflator is 3.85 for 1993 and 8.40 for 1996.
8It is often useful to begin with a look at the underlying distribution before considering the
indexes based on this distribution. Table 2 and Figure 1 show that inequality improved over this
7-year period. The consumption share of the bottom decile increases from 1.88 to 2.84 percent
over the period, and in the bottom quintile, the shares move from 4.95 to 7.06 percent. At the top
there is a corresponding decline in consumption shares. Consumption in the top decile moves
from 32.28 to 29.17 percent of the total, and for the top quintile, the share declines from 49.12 to
44.45. The distributional shift that has occurred in Jamaica was therefore largely from the upper
20 percent of the population to the lower 60 percent.
Table 2
PER CAPITA EXPENDITURE SHARES (%) BY DECILE
Decile 1989 1993 1996
1 1.88 2.41 2.84
2 3.07 3.87 4.22
3 4.15 5.02 5.15
4 5.26 6.05 6.12
5 6.46 7.14 7.28
6 7.96 8.47 8.47
7 9.77 9.92 9.79
8 12.33 12.19 11.68
9 16.84 15.96 15.28
10 32.28 28.98 29.17
Table 3









1989 44.0 34.2 7.8 14.0
1990 42.8 36.7 7.8 12.7
1991 41.8 39.5 7.3 11.4
1992 39.8 39.9 7.2 13.1
1993 43.6 34.6 7.5 14.3
1994 41.9 37.6 6.9 13.6
1995 42.8 35.3 7.0 14.8
1996 43.6 35.7 6.9 13.8
Source: National Income and Product Accounts, various years, Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
Note: Rows sum to 100.
Reflecting the above observation of declining inequality, the value of the inequality
indexes for the full sample reported in Table 1 show steady declines over this period. The Gini
coefficient declines from 43.6 to 36.9 percent, and the Theil from 34.1 to 25.1 percent. Note
however, that while inequality was apparently falling during this period, poverty was rising—
mean per capita expenditure in constant Jamaican dollars falls significantly over this time period,
from J$6407 to J$4961. Therefore, the decline in inequality took place in an economic context of
increased impoverishment. That is, there is a reverse convergence wherein the income of the
relatively wealthy is declining faster than that of the poor.
9Figure 1







































Romaguerra (1998) argues and evidences that household survey data may sometimes
mislead, and therefore requires corroboration. In Figure 2, the ratio of operating surplus to
employee compensation from the national accounts is graphed along with the expenditure share
of the highest quintile from the household survey. Between 1989 and 1992, there is no
correlation between the two measures, either in terms of direction of change or coincidence of
turning points. After 1992, however, the two move closely together, corroborating the claim that






















































O p e r a t i n g  S u r p l u s  R a t i o
T o p  Q u i n t i l e  S h a r e
Note: Operating Surplus Ratio = Ratio of operating surplus to employee compensation from the national
accounts; Top Quintile Share = Share of highest quintile in total expenditure from the household survey.
Source: Authors computation from the National Income and Product Accounts of the Statistical Institute of
Jamaica and from the Jamaica Survey of Living Conditions.
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1.  Theil decompositions
The Theil inequality index can be decomposed in order to assess the contribution of sub-group
inequality to total inequality (Bourguinon, 1979).  A formula for the decomposition analysis is
Theil Index  =  Σ {qi*Ti + qi*log(qi /pi)},
where the left hand side is the Theil Index for the full sample, qi is the income share of group i,
pi is the population share of group i, and Ti is the Theil index for sub-group i.  The first term on
the right hand side of the equation is the ‘within’ group inequality index; the second term is the
‘between’ group inequality index; and the ratio of the between to full sample indexes gives the
proportion of total inequality attributable to group i.
Table 4 provides decompositions based on 6 different levels of education.3  The striking
result is the huge increase in the proportion of total inequality that is explained by differences
between education groups.  In 1989 only 4 percent of total inequality was explained by
differences between education groups, while in 1993 and 1996 this proportion rose to 16 percent.
The detailed decompositions indicate that differences in consumption are largest between those
whose household head had attained A-levels and those whose head had not.  The within group
estimates indicate that inequality is highest among those living in a household headed by a
primary school graduate, or a graduate of the first level secondary school.
Table 4
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.013 0.043 0.041
None -0.034 -0.005 -0.011
Some primary -0.010 -0.024 -0.013
Primary -0.054 -0.045 -0.033
1st cycle secondary -0.027 -0.025 -0.032
2nd cycle secondary 0.040 0.037 0.033
A-level or above 0.097 0.105 0.098
Within 0.301 0.215 0.210
None 0.006 0.001 0.010
Some primary 0.043 0.010 0.015
Primary 0.096 0.068 0.050
1st cycle secondary 0.084 0.054 0.063
2nd cycle secondary 0.031 0.040 0.044
A-level or above 0.041 0.042 0.028
THEIL 0.313 0.258 0.252
Between/THEIL 0.040 0.168 0.164
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Table 5
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY ECONOMIC SECTOR
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.003 0.001 0.009
Agriculture tradable -0.043 -0.045 -0.007
Agriculture non-tradable -0.047 -0.060 -0.043
Mining 0.008 0.002 0.000
Manufacturing 0.028 0.017 0.015
Services tradable 0.041 0.027 0.008
Services non-tradable 0.016 0.060 0.036
Within 0.320 0.229 0.237
Agriculture tradable 0.004 0.006 0.005
Agriculture non-tradable 0.073 0.037 0.042
Mining 0.004 0.002 0.000
Manufacturing 0.043 0.024 0.015
Services tradable 0.088 0.022 0.008
Services non-tradable 0.108 0.138 0.167
THEIL 0.323 0.230 0.246
Between/THEIL 0.009 0.004 0.036
The contribution of inequality between age groups to total inequality has remained stable
at 5 percent over this period (Table 6). However, the prime age group (25-60) has both the
highest within and between Theil indexes, which, when added together, represent 70 percent of
the full sample Theil. Hence, not only is this group characterized by high within group
inequality, but inequality between this group and other age groups is also an important source of
inequality in Jamaica.
Table 6
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY AGE GROUP
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.017 0.013 0.015
0-15 -0.065 -0.064 -0.068
16-24 -0.009 -0.004 -0.003
25-60 0.086 0.079 0.072
61+ 0.005 0.002 0.014
Within 0.325 0.246 0.236
0-15 0.086 0.067 0.053
16-24 0.055 0.037 0.033
25-60 0.151 0.114 0.109
61+ 0.033 0.028 0.040
THEIL 0.342 0.259 0.250
Between/THEIL 0.051 0.051 0.059
Decomposition analysis based on geographic area is presented in Table 7, and show that
the percent of total inequality explained by regional inequalities has declined moderately over
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this time period, from 8.8 percent in 1989 to 6.2 percent in 1996. The within group indexes show
that inequality within rural areas was higher than in urban areas in 1989, but is now actually
lower than in urban areas in 1996. Note that the within and between components for urban areas
together account for approximately 90 percent of total inequality in Jamaica.
Table 7
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.030 0.021 0.016
Urban 0.138 0.111 0.095
Rural -0.108 -0.090 -0.080
Within 0.311 0.240 0.235
Urban 0.152 0.149 0.138
Rural 0.159 0.091 0.097
THEIL 0.341 0.260 0.251
Between/THEIL 0.088 0.079 0.062
Table 8 presents the decomposition analysis by gender, and shows that virtually none of
total inequality is explained by differences between males and females, but rather within these
two groups. For example, inequality among males alone accounts for over 50 percent of total
inequality in Jamaica. This outcome, however, laregly reflects the result of using per capita
household expenditure, where households commonly contain both sexes.
Table 8
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY GENDER OF PERSON
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.001 0.000 0.001
Male 0.018 0.004 0.026
Female -0.018 -0.004 -0.024
Within 0.340 0.260 0.249
Male 0.183 0.123 0.142
Female 0.157 0.137 0.107
THEIL 0.341 0.260 0.251
Between/THEIL 0.002 0.000 0.005
In Jamaica, 42 percent of households are headed by females, hence it is particularly
important to understand differences in well being between male and female households. Table 9
provides decomposition analysis of inequality based on gender of the household head, and
reveals that only 1-2 percent of total inequality is explained by inequality between these two
groups. On the other hand, inequality is very high within each group, especially among the group
of male-headed households. Inequality among individuals living in male-headed households
alone accounts for 65 percent of total inequality in Jamaica, and this ratio has remained constant
over this time period.
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Table 9
DECOMPOSITION OF THEIL INDEX BY GENDER OF HOUSEHOLD HEAD
1989 1993 1996
Between 0.006 0.003 0.004
Female -0.050 -0.039 -0.044
Male 0.055 0.043 0.048
Within 0.335 0.257 0.246
Female 0.109 0.111 0.084
Male 0.226 0.146 0.162
THEIL 0.341 0.260 0.251
Between/THEIL 0.017 0.013 0.017
2.  Analysis of variance
The contribution of sub-group inequality to total inequality in Jamaica can also be assessed by
the standard analysis of variance to decompose the variance in the log of per capita expenditure
into principal or ‘main’ factors, based on the sub-groups discussed above. We have five groups
or categories of variables: gender of the individual, region of residence4, industry of main earner,
education and age of head. Full results of the ANOVA are given in the appendix, while Table 10
summarizes the main contribution of each factor in terms of its contribution to the total variance
of log per capita expenditure.
Table 10
CONTRIBUTIONS TO OVERALL INEQUALITY FROM ANOVA
Group1 1989 1993 1996
Sex (2) 0.19 0.25 0.25
Region (3) 5.61 1.63 4.76
Industry (6) 1.20 3.26 0.60
Education (6) 5.71 5.95 8.44
Age (4) 2.93 3.42 3.75
Source: ANOVA results in Appendix Table A1.
Notes: Decomposition of variance of log per capita expenditure.
1/ Numbers in parenthesis in this column are number of categories in each group.
The analysis of variance corroborates the conclusions of the Theil decompositions. The R
squared (or percentage of the variance of the dependent variable explained by the main factors)
is around 23 percent in each year, and while the contribution of each specific factor is significant,
the quantitative contribution of each varies significantly. Table 10 indicates that in 1989, both
region of residence and education of head each explained about 5.6 percent of the variance of log
per capita consumption, while the contribution of gender of the individual, though statistically
significant, was virtually zero. Between 1989 and 1993, the contribution of industry almost
triples, from 1.20 to 3.26 percent, and the contribution of region of residence declines. Finally, in
1996 the relative contribution of education increases steeply to 8.4 percent of the total variance
of log per capita expenditure.
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The full ANOVA reported in the appendix allows for two way or interaction effects
among the main variables. Inclusion of these interactions only succeeded in raising total R
squared by 2-4 percent depending on the year. In these estimates, the main effect of gender
becomes statistically insignificant, and the interaction between area and industry and industry
and education are significant, but not quantitatively so (percent of contribution to total variance
always less than 2 percent).
The striking change that has occurred between 1989 and 1996 in terms of the
decomposition of inequality appears to have been the rise in significance of education, evidenced
in both the Theil decomposition and the ANOVA. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the
structure of inequality in 1996 is not far different from that of 1989 for the other categories,
namely, region and industry.
Hence during this period, education has become an increasingly important determinant of
inequality in Jamaican society. That is to say, the education premium has risen. There are two
possible factors thay may underlie such change. First, the level of education of the relatively
more educated may have increased, and along with it, their productive capacity and thus also
their factor earnings. There is, however, no evidence from the public education budget nor
private education expenditure to suggest that such an increase in educational output has occurred.
The second possibility is that the scarcity rents earned by each group has shifted in response to
changes in labor demand.
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II.  ECONOMIC AND POLICY CONTEXT
In light of the observation that the implementation of liberal economic reform is often
accompanied by increasing ineqaulity during the process of economic adjustment, the first place
to look for an explanation of declining inequality in Jamaica is the policy history. We seek to
find out the extent to which structural adjustment reforms have actually been implemented, if
these reforms can explain the decline in inequality, and the role of other policy changes and
economic shocks in the distributional outcome.
1.  Economic reform program
In 1980, the new administration inherited an economy with restrictions on domestic product,
labor, and capital markets, impediments to international trade and capital flows, an overbearing
public sector, and an unstable currency. Jamaica’s economic reform program is assessed in terms
of market liberalization, external openness, the burden of government, and stabilization.
1.1.  External openness
Trade liberalization started in the early part of the 1980s, with the removal of most quantitative
restrictions and their replacement by (in most cases, high) tariffs. Later in the decade, most
remaining quantitative restrictions were removed, while tariffs continued to accord domestic
production protection from international competition. Tariff Reductions have taken place almost
entirely in the 1990s, as part of Jamaica’s participation in the Common External Tariff
agreement of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM).  A measure of the severity of the import
tariff regime is the highest tariff that obtains within each 2-digit aggregation of the harmonized
system commodity code, averaged over all 2-digit categories. Using this index, the average
maximum tariff was 43 percent throughout the 1980s, but fell to 37 percent in the tariff
reductions of 1991. However, the most significant tariff reductions occurred in 1995, when the
average maximum fell to 24 percent. This index reflects a dichotomy since in most cases the
maximum tariff in a category applies to consumer goods, while tariffs on most raw materials and
capital goods have been removed entirely.
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the most effective obstacle to free trade was foreign
exchange control regulations. In the 1980s, the black market premium fluctuated in a range from
10 percent to 65 percent, with the highest premia occuring early in the decade. Exchange control
regulations were removed in 1991, but the central bank issued indicative exchange rates to
commercial banks for another two years, during which time the black market premium fell to
under 10 percent. The foreign exchange market was completely liberalized in 1993, at which
point the black market exchange rate converged to the rate obtained through authorized dealers.
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In consideration of the tariff reductions and exchange control removal of the period 1991
to 1995, we may conclude that, while there may have been only limited economic reform during
the 1980s, there was positive and significant reform during the period 1991 to 1995. And most of
that occurred at the end of that period.
1.2.  Market liberalization
Market liberalization has been partial and inconsistent, with no clear patter emerging that could
be characterized as economic reform. Financial markets were deregulated, to the extent that
deposit rate limits were removed and the use of quantitative credit controls discontinued in 1991.
However, mandatory cash reserve and liquid assets ratios (25 and 47 percent respectively) for
commercial banks remain at high levels by international standards, constraining the capacity of
the banking sector to intermediate savings.
Because of the high reserve requirements, and as evidence of inefficiency in the sector,
the spread between average lending and borrowing rates offered by commercial banks increased
sharply in the nineties. That spread remained at single-digit levels throughout most of the 1980s,
but by 1996 had reached 21.4 percent. Further, the ratio of domestic credit to GDP did not
expand to evidence the deepening of the financial sector which should have followed
liberalization in this sector. Indeed, the domestic credit/GDP ratio was lower after 1991 than it
was before. Between 1980 and 1990, the ratio was between 39 and 86 percent. Between 1991
and 1996, the range was 17 to 33 percent.
Labour market reform has taken the form of reduction in income tax rates and
simplification of the tax structure. At the beginning of the eighties, the structure of taxes on
personal income included six tax brackets with a top marginal rate of 80 percent. In 1981, the
highest marginal rate was reduced to 57.5 percent. Major tax reform occurred in 1986, wherein
the tax structure was greatly simplified to a zero-tax threshold and a single tax rate of 33.3
percent above the threshold. In 1991, that tax rate was lowered to 25 percent. Labor market
reform is incomplete, however. The accommodative legislative framework that governs
collective labor agreements remains unchanged, and the obligatory dismissal cost was actually
increased in 1991 for some categories of workers.
Liberalization in product markets consisted of the removal of price controls. This
occurred throughout the 1980s, and was largely complete by 1990. The only regulated prices that
remained in the 1990s were on public utilities and public transportation.
The accumulation of the above evidence is that domestic market liberalization was
largely not realized. Restrictions in capital market and labor markets remain, and suggest that
economic reform in this area remains to be done. Distributionally, this means that gains in
allocative efficiency that could have been realized to produce GDP growth did not occur.
1.3.  The burden of government
In terms of the burden of government on the economy, policy has again been inconsistent, both
across areas of policy and over time, but a pattern does emerge. The share of public employment
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in the total employed labor force fell from 20 percent in 1980 to 11 percent in 1987, and has
remained nearly constant since then. The privatization program officially began in 1980, but with
no enthusiasm and little execution. Indeed, there was a major acquisition in 1982. Only 13 (net)
privatizations took place between 1980 and 1988, for an annual average of less than 1.5.
Beginning in 1989, however, the pace of privatizations increased considerably. Twelve occurred
in 1989 alone, and between 1990 and 1996 the government averaged more than five
privatizations per year.
Other aspects of the governmental burden have seen reversals, however. The relative size
of government expenditure in the economy, measured by expenditure net of amortization over
the GDP, declined from 50 percent in 1980 to a low of 24 percent in 1989, but since then has
risen, and stood at 35 percent in 1996. And the government share of domestic credit, constant
until 1991, rose sharply after 1993.
The above implies the size of the governmental burden in the economy declined
smoothly up to 1990, after which it reversed itself. This reversal suggests that efficiency gains
that were to be derived from a shrinking governmental burden may have already been exhausted
from the 1980s, while the reversal of the 1980s would be working against the reforms in balance-
of-payments liberalizations for the purpose of the promotion of economic growth.
1.4.  Macroeconomic stability
Jamaica has suffered from volatile, double-digit inflation rates as well as a secularly depreciating
exchange rate since the early 1970s. Relative stability was achieved in the late 1980s, only to be
reversed in the early 1990s when the inflation rate peaked at 80.2 percent in 1991. After that, an
orthodox, disinflation program based on reductions in the growth rate of the monetary base
gradually pushed down the inflation rate until it reached 15.8 percent in 1996.
While the decline in the growth rate of the monetary base and in inflation may suggest a
stable economic environment towards the middle of the decade. Inflationary expectations were
much more intransigent, as evidenced by the domestic/international interest differential as an
indicator of the market’s expectation of the rate of depreciation of the currency (Dornbusch,
1976). The differential between the domestic treasury bill rate and LIBOR (on equal 3-month
instruments) was negative in the early 1980s, and became mildly positive in 1983 and 1984.
From 1985 to 1991, it ranged between 10 and 20 percent, and from 1992 to 1996, fluctuated
between 20 and 40 percent. This evidences a rise in the public’s assessment of the instability of
the currency that belies the consistent fall in inflation rates that has occurred in the 1990s.
The record on the pursuit of macroeconomic stability is therefore mixed. While inflation
fell consistently after 1992, it had not reached single digit levels up to the end of our period
analysis, 1996. Further, inflationary expectations remain high. The macroeconomy, on balance,
was more unstable during the period 1991 to 1996 than it had been in the 1980s.
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1.5.  Assessing the timing and consistency of reform
The evidence presented above suggests that economic reform has been sporadic, uneven, and
inconsistent, with some policy reversals.  The failure of inequality to worsen in Jamaica during a
“period of economic reform” after 1989 may therefore be because a part of the economic reform
had already taken place between 1980 and 1989. Specifically, government expenditure as a share
of GDP and public sector employment as a share of total employment both declined consistently
and dramatically between 1980 and 1989. During that period, the expenditure/GDP share fell
from 50 to 24 percent while public sector employment was reduced from 20 percent of the labor
force to 11 percent. Furthermore, the income tax reform program was implemented almost
entirely prior to 1989. One effect of the income tax reform was to replace a progressive tax
structure with a more regressive one. Finally, while foreign exchange controls were not relaxed
until 1991, modifications to the exchange control regime between 1981 and 1983 reduced the
cost of trading in foreign exchange, which effect was manifest in a fall in the black market
premium after 1982. With reduced public expenditure and lower employment, along with
regressive income tax reform, it is likely that some of the negative distributional consequences of
economic reform may already have been manifest prior to 1989.5
While some aspects of the economic reform program were implemented after 1989, the
general program of reform was compromized by policy reversals in other areas. After 1989, the
principle areas of policy reform were privatization and balance-of-payments liberalization. At the
same time, however, the public sector reversed the trend from the previous decade and increased
its share of the economy, both in terms of expenditure and in terms of its use of domestic credit.
The effective income tax rate on average income increased from a low of 20 percent in 1986 to
36 percent in 1992, a change which would disproportionately affect lower income brackets. In
addition, the cost of laying off labor was increased in 1991.
Finally, several parts of the policy environment remained unreformed throughout the
period of analysis. The domestic capital market was subject to high reserve ratios, the labor
market saw no reform of the legislative framework that governs industrial relations, and while
inflation declined, expected depreciation remained high. In aggregate, economic reform, of some
kind, occurred throughout the period from 1980 to 1995. But different aspect of reform occurred
at different times, and reversals tended to send confusing signals to the markets. 1989 to 1996
therefore does not constitute an appropriate period in which to isolate the potential negative
distributional impact of economic reform.
2.  Macroeconomic consequences
The Jamaican economy experienced very little growth over this period (as indeed, over the last
two and a half decades). GDP expanded by a mere 9 percent in total from 1989 to 1993, after
which the economy stagnated and then contracted in 1995 and 1996. This outcome may be
attributed in some part to both the liberalization of trade and capital flows and to the disinflation
policy.
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From the policy program outlined above, the confluence of macroeconomic policy
initiatives that came together during the period 1992 to 1996 consisted of an orthodox
disinflation program based on real monetary contraction combined with fiscal expansion. High
real interest rates were the consequence of the combination. Real interest rates (weighted average
commercial bank prime lending deflated by the Consumer Price Index) averaged negative 4.1
percent in the period from 1989 to 1992. By contrast, from 1993 to 1996 the average was
positive 16.8 percent. With capital flows newly liberalized, the attractive returns on capital
sustained a capital inflow that generated a revaluation of the local currency. In real terms, the
currency appreciated by 45 percent between its historic trough in 1991 and its value in 1996.
High real interest rates, an increasingly overvalued currency, and the removal of
protection from some domestic industries in the tariff reductions of 1991 and 1995, all combined
to reduce economic growth and ultimately, to contract the economy. By 1996, the GDP fell by
1.7 percent, its second consecutive year of decline.
This combination of policies and outcomes can have deep and widespread distributional
implications. Economic contraction reduces the demand for all factors, and the returns to some,
depending on the flexibility of the markets in which they operate. Falling inflation is usually
progressive as wage earners, bound by long-term contracts with embedded wage escalation,
benefit from inflation outturns that are lower than expected. But falling inflation may have
perverse consequences at the low end of the income structure, since informal sector workers tend
not to be bound by formal contracts at all and may not derive this “benefit” that accrues to
workers in the formal sector.
The direct distributional effect of interest rates will depend on which income strata are
net creditors/debtors. The indirect effect of interest rates, through disinvestment and recession,
will depend on the whether firms tend to layoff quickly or hoard labor. Finally, the restructuring
of the economy necessitated by the more open trade regime may shift the demand for various
factors of production.
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III.  EXPLAINING THE DISTRIBUTIONAL CHANGES
The argument thus far suggests only that the sequence of reform implementation explains why
the income distribution did not worsen between 1989 and 1996. An explanation of why it
improved is still required. The salient aspects of the distributional evolution emerging from
above that require explanation are as follows. Over the entire period, narrowing inequality is
accompanied by rising poverty – the distribution is shifting down.
To understand the changes in distribution, we divide the total period of our analysis at
1993. Before this, dramatically falling inequality is accompanied marginally falling poverty – the
poor are improving both absolutely and relatively. Subsequently, moderately falling inequality
occurs with rising poverty – the poor are worse absolutely, but better off relatively. Further, the
decline in inequality seems to be motivated by a redistribution from the wealthiest quintile to
everyone else.
In order to trace the distributional consequences of economic reform in Jamaica, one
needs to focus on the interaction between and amongst distribution and aspects of economic
reform that were present in the period from 1990 to 1996. As indicated above, the relevant
aspects of economic reform were trade liberalization, capital flow liberalization, fiscal
expansion, along with orthodox stabilization. Below, we argue that liberalization of international
capital flows and its consequences, along with fiscal expansion, swamped whatever potential
distributional benefit would have come of trade liberalization.
1.  Sectoral adjustment
The immediate distributional implications of balance-of-payments liberalization ought to have
been a contraction in newly exposed industries. If trade restrictions had been applied uniformly,
the sectors that would have derived the most protection would have been those with the least
comparative advantage. In a small economy, those sectors are more often than not industrial,
which make intensive use of physical and human capital. Under such circumstances, the external
liberalization would be progressive, shifting the functional distribution towards labor and
lowering the skill premium.
In Jamaica, however, with its hilly terrain and small domestic market, it is arguable that
Jamaica lacks a comparative advantage in agriculture. In any case, the agricultural sector was
highly uncompetitive, in sugar, bananas, and vegetables – the main crops, and were thus the
beneficiaries high levels of protection under the old tariff regime. Put another way, both
manufacturing and agriculture produced vulnerable importables. In the immediate aftermath of
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trade liberalization, these sectors ought to contract in favor of non-tradables, which tend to be
both labor and non-skill intensive. Again, given labor market regidities, such a contraction would
affect the functional distribution by first having an impact on operating surpluses. For both of
these reasons, the impact effect of external opening should be progressive, though not
necessarily through the usual shift from manufacturing towards agriculture. Ultimately, of
course, the expansion of exportables, from wherever they may come, will complicate the
distributional outcomes.
Further, the sectoral shifts expected from trade liberalization would have been enhanced
by the effect of the currency appreciation. Tradable sectors on both sides of the trade balance
would have become less competitive with respect to world production and should have
contracted relative to non-tradables, further promoting a progressive distributional outcome.
There is at least superficial consistency between the theoretically expected distributional
shifts and the empirical outcome of less inequality evidenced by the data presented above.  But
this is not what has happened in Jamaica. Neither the relative price changes nor the sectoral
shifts in the structure of trade support such a Stolper-Samuelson type explanation. Table 12
showing sectoral economic performance indicates no broad tendency for tradables to grow at the
expense of non-tradables. Tradable manufactures declined while tradable agriculture stagnated
and tradable services grew spectacularly. The failure of the structure of trade to respond in the
expected direction is not surprising in the presence of relative price shifts that did not reflect an













1988 1.03 0.85 1.20 1.01 1.06 0.99
1989 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
1990 0.99 0.86 0.85 1.01 0.96 1.03
1991 0.94 0.94 0.94 1.08 0.83 0.98
1992 1.22 0.93 0.85 1.10 0.75 1.00
1993 1.14 0.89 0.60 1.09 0.53 1.05
1994 1.09 0.95 0.63 1.11 0.61 1.03
1995 1.09 0.95 0.66 1.05 0.57 1.02
1996 1.06 0.80 0.50 1.02 0.63 1.01
Source: Author’s computations from the National Income and Product Accounts, Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
Notwithstanding our failure to identify a relative price motivation, a significant feature of
the entire period is the impressive growth in domestic agricultural production.  Between 1989 and
1993, non-tradable agriculture, mainly root crops and spices, grew by an accumulated 47 percent,
and up to 1996 by an accumulated 69 percent (Table 12). Some of this represented recovery from a
temporarily low base. The 1989 survey data was gathered less than one year after a hurricane
destroyed much agricultural capacity, but this does not explain the entire increase, which continued
through to 1996. Export agriculture, mainly sugar and bananas grown on large estates by
commensurately large enterprises, did not fare near as well, rising only six percent over the same
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four year period. Domestic agriculture in Jamaica, as elsewhere, occupies the poorest of the
population, so improvement in the sector will improve the income distribution.  In order to
understand the remainder of the distributional shift, we must look to factor price changes.
Table 12
CHANGES IN THE SECTORAL STRUCTURE OF PRODUCTION
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
SHARES
Agriculture tradable 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0
Agriculture non-tradable 4.4 4.6 4.6 5.1 5.3 5.8 5.8 5.9
Mining 7.0 8.1 8.4 7.9 7.4 7.9 7.2 7.7
Manufacture 20.0 19.6 17.9 17.5 16.0 15.8 15.5 14.9
Services tradable 11.2 11.5 13.2 14.0 18.1 17.7 18.0 17.7
Services non-tradable 56.3 55.0 54.8 54.4 52.0 51.8 52.6 52.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
INDEX OF LEVEL
Agriculture tradable 100 107 105 106 108 106 101 109
Agriculture non-tradable 100 113 113 131 147 160 165 169
Mining 100 123 130 126 127 136 126 136
Manufacture 100 104 96 97 95 95 95 92
Services tradable 100 109 127 140 194 190 198 197
Services non-tradable 100 104 105 108 110 110 115 116
Total 100 105 106 108 109 110 111 109
CONSTANT DOLLARS
Agriculture tradable 200 213 210 211 215 212 202 218
Agriculture non-tradable 769 867 868 1,009 1,127 1,231 1,269 1,301
Mining 1,238 1,521 1,607 1,566 1,571 1,680 1,565 1,683
Manufacture 3,541 3,678 3,401 3,445 3,378 3,360 3,361 3,258
Services tradable 1,971 2,147 2,512 2,758 3,829 3,748 3,906 3,884
Services non-tradable 9,942 10,299 10,429 10,726 10,975 10,985 11,448 11,544
Total 17,660 18,726 19,027 19,714 21,096 21,216 21,751 21,887
Source: National Income and Product Account, Various Years, Statistical Institure of Jamaica.
2.  Factor price changes
2.1.  Changes in factor prices
Because the period of analysis, 1989-96, is relatively short, factor supplies did not change in an
economically significant way during that time. For that period, the average growth rate of the labor
force was 1.1 percent, with the growth rate having a standard deviation of only 1.98.  At the same
time, however, the average of the annual absolute changes in the real wage was 11.4 percent, with
a standard deviation of the change in the wage of 14.8. Changes in labor supply cannot therefore
account for the observed wage fluctuations. The skill structure of the labor force also remained
virtually unchanged over the period. While 82.7 percent of the labor force had neither professional
nor vocational training in 1989, by 1996 that percentage had fallen only marginally to 80.5.
Similarly, the effect of net capital formation on the total capital stock from year to year is
negligable, compared to the observed fluctuations in the return to capital. We therefore look to
factor price changes induced by changes in factor demand or in the structure of the labor market.
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Rather, the evolution of the distribution of income in Jamaica reflects factor price
changes induced by macroeconomic fluctuations. Of particular significance are: positive
economic growth to 1993 and stagnation thereafter; and dramatically rising inflation to 1991,
followed by the successful disinflation. Those events, along with an appropriate specification of
a segmented labor market, produces the factor price changes that provide an explanation of the
distributional outcomes that have occurred.
Theoretically, recessions have clear distributional consequences. In so far as operating
surplus is the residual after labor and other costs are met, revenue contraction is first manifest in
a relative shift in the functional distribution of income away from operating surplus towards
labor. Further, since the fixed cost of hiring and training tend to be higher for employees with
more human capital, layoffs occur first at the bottom of the skill distribution. These
considerations set up contradictionary but clear distributional expectations. The functional shift
is progressive, but affects earners of operating surplus – the top of the income distribution. The
layoffs directly affect the distribution of labor income and should be manifest as a rise in the skill
premium.
In order to understand how these recession induced changes in the demand for labor and
disinflation affect the structure of wages, we characterize the labor market in Jamaica. Formal,
negotiated labor contracts with terms of up to three years are pervasive, with predetermined
wage escalation not indexed to changes in the CPI, and so wage adjustment to changing
inflationary expectations is slow. In other words, backward-looking contracts are the norm.
Because of this, the wage adjustment lag may be as long as three years, and perhaps longer. We
therefore assume historically determined (and thus contemporarily exogenous) wages in the
formal labor market.
The slow response of nominal wages and the consequent volatility of real wages
following the rise and fall in the inflation rate in the early 1990s evidence the validity of this
assumption. Note from Table 13 that when inflation soared in 1981 to 80 percent, the nominal
wages of neither skilled or unskilled increased commensurately. Wage inflation for each group in
that year was closer to the price inflation rate of the year before, around 30 percent. In addition,
though the rate of consumer price inflation fell in the two subsequent years, wage inflation rose
in both years. That is, in 1993, wage inflation of 59 percent (compared to price inflation of 30
percent) represented the lagged effect of the 80 percent price inflation two years earlier.
We therefore stylize the labor market with a dichotomy into formal and informal
segments. In the formal labor market, following the above observations, nominal wages are rigid.
(All the wage data in would apply to the formal segment). Employment in the formal sector is
therefore determined by the demand side of the labor market. Residual labor is employed in the
informal sector where wages are flexible and there is no effective unemployment, though some
types of economic activities may be so classified by the employment survey and some who are











All Skilled Unskilled Skill
Premium
1989 100 6.8 100 100 100 12.5 20.6 14.2 2.15
1990 89 0.6 100 97 119 19.6 22.2 18.5 2.22
1991 65 -27.0 87 83 157 31.7 31.6 28.7 2.27
1992 46 3.3 75 69 237 51.0 52.4 47.9 2.34
1993 40 10.4 95 89 378 59.0 54.8 58.1 2.29
1994 36 17.8 96 100 538 42.4 35.9 50.3 2.07
1995 41 14.4 115 101 723 34.3 43.8 21.5 2.45
1996 43 24.3 112 92 904 25.0 31.0 17.7 2.73
Source: Author’s computations from data provided by theStatistical Institute of Jamaica.
The factor prices that are important to the distributional story are the rate of interest and
wages in both labor market segments. Regarding interest rates, the increase described above had
consequences for property values and their associated rental income. As an indicator, the rental
price of housing declined in real terms by 57 percent between 1989 and 1996. For wages, in the
context of an inefficient labor market with lagged wage adjustment, the unanticipated inflation
changes resulted in falling real wages in the formal labor market up until 1992, rising thereafter up
to 1995. The effect of these formal market developments on the informal labor market, and
therefore on the fortunes of the poor, derive from the assumption that has been made about the
movement of labor between the two markets. Specifically, the outcome derives from the
assumption of free mobility between the two markets and full employment in the informal market.
Table 14
UNEMPLOYMENT RATES
Gender Age Geography Skill Sector









1988 18.9 12.0 26.8 44.7 23.7 8.6 3.2 18.2 19.4 15.5 12.0 19.8 3.5 13.4 26.7
1989 18.0 10.9 26.1 48.7 22.5 8.1 2.7 17.7 18.2 16.6 13.2 18.5 3.0 14.2 25.0
1990 15.3 9.1 22.4 37.9 20.4 6.4 2.2 14.5 16.0 13.4 10.0 16.0 2.1 12.6 20.7
1991 15.4 9.4 22.2 39.2 19.0 7.2 2.9 14.0 16.4 11.7 11.8 16.1 3.0 13.7 20.1
1992 15.8 9.5 22.8 35.8 19.1 9.2 5.6 15.5 15.9 15.0 12.4 16.2 5.7 13.6 20.1
1993 16.3 10.9 22.4 38.0 19.3 9.4 4.9 13.2 18.7 15.3 11.0 17.0 4.7 13.6 20.6
1994 15.3 9.6 21.8 35.5 17.6 10.0 5.9 13.9 16.5 13.2 11.4 13.3 5.8 13.1 18.5
1995 16.2 10.8 22.5 45.6 19.7 7.3 2.2 14.5 17.6 14.1 10.4 17.0 3.4 16.9 20.0
1996 16.0 10.0 23.0 47.7 19.4 6.9 2.7 13.5 18.0 14.6 9.8 16.7 3.4 17.0 19.5
Source: Author’s computations from data provided by the Statistical Institute of Jamaica.
Table 14 presents data on unemployment rates by various labor market decompositions.
Almost as a matter of definition, we do not have data on employment in the informal sector.
However, evidence for full employment in informal activities may be drawn from two sources.
First, note that though unemployment rates in manufacturing and services is high, unemployment
rates in agriculture are negligable and much informal activity resides in agriculture. More
significantly, the household survey for 1993 (which had an expanded employment module)
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revealed that households that contained an unemployed head of household had expenditure levels
that were comparable to and in the case of some sectors higher than that of employed
households. This expenditure level of unemployed households is likely based on informal
economic activity.
In the presence of declining inflation and backward-looking labor contracts, formal sector
wages rose in the mid 1990s. Rising wages and falling aggregate demand encouraged large
establishments to shed labor to the informal sector. Employment in large establishments fell by
3.2 percent between 1992 and 1995. With full employment in the informal sector, earnings in the
informal sector must have declined. Unfortunately, there is no direct observation of the wage
level in the informal sector. However, the significance of education as a explanatory variable for
inequality rises over the period. Since the skill demands of informal sector employment are
lower than that in the formal labor market, the fall in the informal sector earnings relative to
formal sector employment is at least consistent with a rise in the explanatory power of education.
In addition, the wage data show a corroborating rise in the skill premium (Table 13). The skill
premium increased by 16.7 percent between 1992 and 1996, despite 1992 being previously a
peak value for the skill premium.
In summary, the relevant factor prices therefore moved in the following way after 1992.
Property rents, having declined to 1992, remained low; interest rates rose dramatically; wages for
all classes of formal sector workers increased steadily while employment declined; and informal
sector wages probably fell.
2.2.  The distributional consequences
The salient feature of the change in the income distribution is the redistribution from the highest
quintile towards every other quintile. It is, therefore, the relative loss of income of the highest
quintile that requires explanation.
Jamaica has poor data on actual income. In the quarterly Labor Force Survey, in which
income data is collected, the income cells are as often as not blank. Due to the possibility of
selection bias, the remaining cells do not yield reliable information. Therefore, there is no way to
directly connect the quintiles to particular income sources. Under these circumstances, we are
forced to speculate as to the factor prices that are most likely relevant to each quintile.
Analytically, we treat three income groups. The highest income group, which
corresponds to the first quintile, is hypythesized to receive its income from formal sector wages
and property ownership. It is likely that the highest quintile is a net debtor, taking into account
the corporate debt of enterprise holdings.6 This is especially likely to evolve in an economic
environment that was characterized by negative, real interests rates, with its associated tendency
for over-indebtedness.
The middle quintiles would be the corresponding net creditors through ordinary savings
instruments, mutual funds, and pension funds. This income group would also likely derive the
majority of its income from formal sector employment. The lowest income group, corresponding
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to the fifth quintile and perhaps some of the fourth, derives most of its income from informal
sector employment, some from the formal labor market, and none from interest income. This
latter extreme assumption regarding interest income derives from the observation that, to the
extent that the lowest quintile holds savings instruments, it is more likely to be in ordinary
savings accounts which pay a low and less volatile interest rate or in revolving credit
arrangements which pay none at all.
From all the foregoing, the following hypothesis emerges. The redistribution from the
highest quintile to the remainder of the population would be accounted for by the fact that that
income group would have negatively affected by declining property values and rents and high
interest rates. Property income represents a larger share of the income of the upper quintiles. The
decline in property rents would affect those quintiles more than it would the poorer quintiles in
the distribution. The move from negative to positive interest rates would also have adversely
affected the earnings of the highest quintile given their net debtor status, at least to a greater
extent than other income groups.
At the same time, the middle quintiles would have benefitted from the evolution of wage
levels. The data differentiate two types of workers in the formal sector: salaried workers are
those who occupy executive, clerical, or supervisory positions in the enterprise, while wage
earners are directly engaged in the production of output. Salaried workers therefore tend to have
higher levels of human capital. Wage earners, while including some highly skilled line workers,
would include greater numbers of unskilled workers. In the aggregate, therefore, the earnings of
salaried workers would include a higher skill premium.
Wages of both salaried employees and wage earners, after declining dramatically in 1991
and 1992, rose steadily after that up to 1995 (Table 13). During that period, the real wages of
salaried workers rose by 53 percent in real terms. That of wage earners went up by 46 percent.
For the most part, those dramatic real wage gains represent a recovery from the inflation induced
trough of 1992. But while the wage levels of wage earners merely regained their real 1989 values
by 1995, that of salaried workers was 15 percent above their 1989 levels, in an economy that had
not grown by 15 percent in real terms.
This increase in real wages would help to explain the observed redistribution, at least
with respect to the middle to low quintiles. Finally, with the general economy stagnating and
formal sector wages rising, the increasing numbers of persons competing for a share of product




In the wake of economic reform, inequality declined while poverty rose - the distribution shifted
down. The paradox of declining inequality in Jamaica in the context of liberal economic reforms
is reduced to the dominance of stabilization over incomplete adjustment. While the liberalization
of domestic financial markets and international finance and trade was taking place, economic
reforms in other aspects of the economy, in the market for labor and in the size of government,
did not occur. The structural adjustment of the economy was pursued inconsistently and
incompletely. Stabilization policy and its macroeconomic consequences overwhelmed the other
economic stimuli and dominated the distributional changes.
In particular, the fall in the value of physical capital and the rise in the cost of financial
capital adversely affected the fortunes of the wealthiest quintile, which underlie the substantial
distributional shift from that group to everyone else below. At the same, the middle strata was
somewhat protected by the inflexibility of the formal labor market, as they were able to pass on
some of the cost of adjustment to lowest quintile.
The decline in inequality in Jamaica in the 1990s was due mainly to the negative
macroeconomic consequences of the stabilization aspect of the reform program, and partly to the
lackluster implementation of the adjustment aspects. This hardly provides a lesson for other
reforming economies to emulate.
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The appendix presents the full results of the analysis of variance exercise
Table 1
RESULTS OF ANOVA
Using log per capita consumption expenditure as dependent variable: Jamaica (1989, 1993, 1996)
1989
Number of obs = 11465 R-squared = 0.2335
Root MSE = .702777 Adj R-squared = 0.2324
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 1722.12789 16 107.632993 217.93 0.0000
Sex 14.2656112 1 14.2656112 28.88 0.0000
Region 413.706831 2 206.853416 418.82 0.0000
Industry 88.7145659 5 17.7429132 35.92 0.0000
Education 420.977419 5 84.1954838 170.47 0.0000
Age 216.131753 3 72.0439178 145.87 0.0000
Residual 5654.1202 11448 .493895895
Total 7376.24809 11464 .643427084
1993
Number of obs = 6837 R-squared = 0.2477
Root MSE  = .596232 Adj R-squared =  0.2459
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 798.1635 16 49.8852188 140.33 0.0000
Sex 8.05154009 1 8.05154009 22.65 0.0000
Area 54.2148658 2 27.1074329 76.25 0.0000
Indcat 105.117325 5 21.0234651 59.14 0.0000
Edlevel 191.848909 5 38.3697818 107.93 0.0000
Agecat 114.112275 3 38.0374252 107.00 0.0000
Residual 2424.46215 6820 .355492984
Total 3222.62565 6836 .471419785
1996
Number of obs = 6359 R-squared =  0.2369
Root MSE      = .564226 Adj R-squared = 0.2350
Source Partial SS df MS F Prob > F
Model 626.784292 16 39.1740183 123.05 0.0000
Sex 6.69689486 1 6.69689486 21.04 0.0000
Area 125.860396 2 62.930198 197.68 0.0000
Indcat 15.7405767 5 3.14811534 9.89 0.0000
Edlevel 223.302908 5 44.6605816 140.29 0.0000
Agecat 99.176387 3 33.0587957 103.84 0.0000
Residual 2018.98192 6342 .318350981
Total 2645.76621 6358 .416131836
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APPENDIX B
The assumptions being made in this paper about labor market segmentation and the consequence
for wage formation are illustrated in this appendix.
Figure 1
A MODEL OF SEGMENTED LABOR MARKETS
(a)           (b)
                           DF       S                      DI                                DF                                DI
            wF                                                                               wF
                                                                               wI                                                                    wI
               OF                    LF                                  OI    OF                                                              OI
Following Agenor (1996), the relationship between the two can be represented as in
Figure 1. In panel “a”, the formal labor market is represented by the left vertical axis, measuring
the wage, and the horizontal axis reading from left to right. The demand for labor is represented
by the downward-sloping curve, DF. In a corresponding manner, the informal labor market is
portrayed by the vertical axis on the right, measuring informal sector wages, and the horizontal
axis with its origin to the right. The downward-sloping (right to left) curve, DI, represents the
demand for labor in the informal sector. The length of the horizontal axis is determined by the
total amount of labor available in the economy, while the vertical line, S, is positioned to indicate
the allocation of labor between the two markets.
The consequences for the informal sector of developments in the formal labor market
depend on the assumptions made about endogeniety. If there is no movement of labor between
the two markets, that is, S is exogenous, the two wage levels are endogenously determined. This
case is shown in panel “a”. If there is perfect labor mobility, both the allocation of labor and the
uniform wage rate are determined by the intersection of the two demand curves (not shown).
Finally, if formal sector wages are determined exogenously, either by a legislated minimum
wage or by a historically determined wage, then both the allocation of labor and the informal
sector wage are endogenous. This possibility is illustrated in panel “b”.
35
APPENDIX C
In light of the significant distributional changes that have occurred in Jamaica over a short
period, it becomes legitimate to ask whether similar redistribution should be engineered as a
poverty alleviation mechanism which is alternative to faster growth. In this section, we measure
the response of poverty to economic growth alone, holding distribution constant, as well as the
impact on poverty alleviation of policies that only reduce inequality without increasing economic
growth. This provides evidence to help determine which type of strategy will have a greater
impact on poverty reduction.
Table 15 presents estimates of the elasticity of three Foster-Greer-Thorbecke poverty
measures (headcount, poverty gap and squared poverty gap) with respect to a small change in
mean per capita expenditure (holding distribution constant), and with respect to a small change
in inequality (holding growth constant).7 For each year, we start by presenting the actual value of
each of the poverty measures, and as noted above, poverty increased quite dramatically during
this period, despite the decline in inequality. In these calculations, the poverty line is set at
approximately US$60 per year (measured in J$) in 1989, and then inflated by the CPI to get the
poverty line for 1993 and 1996. Hence, the poverty line is held constant in real terms over this
period to facilitate analyses over time. The headcount index registers 45.1 percent of the sample
poor in 1989, compared to 54.9 in 1996. The poverty gap increases slightly over this period, but
the squared poverty gap (which reflects inequality among those below the poverty line) stays
about the same. Note that all indices show a decline in 1993.
Table 15
IMPACT OF GROWTH AND DISTRIBUTION ON POVERTY
1989 1993 1996
Elasticity wrt1 Elasticity wrt Elasticity wrt
Poverty Measure Value Mean Gini Value Mean Gini Value Mean Gini
Head Count 45.1 -1.08 0.58 42.9 -1.37 0.60 54.9 -1.17 0.22
Poverty gap 18.3 -1.47 2.32 15.2 -1.82 2.24 19.8 -1.77 1.52
Sq. Poverty gap 9.7 -1.79 4.03 7.2 -2.21 3.85 9.4 -2.19 2.79
1/ Elasticity of each of the poverty measures with respect to mean per capita expenditure holding distribution
constant, and with respect to the Gini coefficient holding mean per capita expenditure constant.
What is the impact of distribution-neutral growth on poverty in Jamaica? The elasticities
with respect to mean consumption are all greater than one in absolute value – a one percent
increase in mean consumption will lead to a more than one percent decline in poverty (in 1996
for example, the headcount index would fall by 1.17 percent). Hence in Jamaica, distribution
neutral growth would decrease poverty. Declines in inequality would also decrease poverty, but
not by as much. A one percent decline in the Gini, holding mean consumption constant, would
reduce the headcount index by 0.58 percent in 1989, and by a mere 0.22 percent in 1996. Note
however, that declines in inequality would have a much larger impact on inequality amongst the
poor (measured by the squared poverty gap) than would increases in mean consumption that
maintained the present distribution. A one percent decline in the Gini in 1989 would reduce the
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squared poverty gap by 4.03 percent, while a similar increase in growth (holding the Gini
constant) would only reduce this measure by 1.79 percent.
The analysis, as is, has an obvious limitation. The resource cost of one percent changes in
each of growth and the Gini coefficient may not be equal, and therefore may not be comparable.
Estimating those resource costs is a possible area for future research.
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Notes
1 Paraguay also evidenced a decline in inequality, over the latter part of the decade, but does not have a
comparable observation from 1980.
2 Neither Ahiram’s data nor that of McClure (1977) is comparable to that presented below, nor
comparable to each other.  Ahiram uses gross formal labor market income, excluding capital income,
income in kind, home production, and informal activity as the basis for his computation of inequality.
McClure uses gross labor market income from all activities plus the imputed value of home production.
3 The full sample Theil indexes in Table 4 and Table 5 may not match those given in the other tables
because some missing values for education and sector of employment resulted in slightly smaller samples.
4 Region is broken into two categories in Table 7, but three categories (Kingston, other towns, rural) are
used in the ANOVA presented in Table 10.
5 Since annual household surveys for Jamaica began only in 1989, it is not possible to speak definitively
about distributional changes before that time.
6 The assertion is difficult to evidence because the response rate to the relevant question in the household
survey is poor.
7 The calculations were made with the POVCAL software package.  Thanks to Gaurav Datt for making
this available to us.
